by David B. Funderburk

Reprinted with permission from The New American, December 4, 1989

Mr. Funderburk is a former U.S. Ambassador to Romania, and Chairman of the Selous Foundation.

U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under President George Bush is nearly identical to Henry Kissinger’s policy of almost 20 years ago. And today the principal implementors of foreign policy are Kissinger devotees who got their starts under Kissinger. Thus a good case can be made for describing current U.S. foreign policy as Kissingerian.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, who fled to America from Nazi Germany, was first promoted to Richard Nixon by New York’s Nelson Rockefeller. Harvard Professor Kissinger served as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser under President Nixon. Kissinger emphasized deal-making and game-playing between heads of state and between foreign ministers.

The State Department tendency has long been to maintain status quo relations government to government, and to look out for the interests of the “client” government. In overall policy direction and ideology, the implemented policies of Henry Kissinger were virtually indistinguishable from those of the State Department. One Kissinger imprint was devising ways to assist East European communist regimes “creatively.”

Kissinger and Nixon formalized a policy of differentiation for communist Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the State Department favored so-called “good communist” governments over “bad communist” ones. The rewards included financial/economic assistance through Most Favored Nation status, a higher level of technology shipments, and political support via high-level visit exchanges. Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Yugoslavia (outside the Warsaw Pact) received “good communist” treatment, while Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany were branded “bad communists.” Kissinger’s differentiation assisted several communist regimes in the USSR’s East European empire. U.S. policymakers actively devised ways to help prop up unpopular and repressive regimes, thereby enabling the Soviets to maintain communist domination and control for less money.

Inordinate Influence

From the early 1970s through the 1980s, a Kissingerian policy was implemented by Kissinger protégés and sympathetic State Department officials. The principal beneficiaries of such a policy — other than the communists rewarded — were the members of the American financial and political establishment. Elite representatives of major banks, businesses, the media, and the State Department eagerly supported a policy that perpetuated their inordinate influence over political, economic, and financial decision-making in the U.S. Leaders from these groups — epitomized by Kissinger and others on the Council on Foreign Relations — move freely from top positions in government to banks, corporations, and the media.

The most notable cases are those of Richard Burt, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Brent Scowcroft. Burt moved from political/military correspondent for the New York Times to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to Ambassador to West Germany to present-day head of START talks. Eagleburger moved from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (following stints as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and Ambassador to Yugoslavia) to president of Kissinger Associates to his current Number Two position as Deputy Secretary of State. Similarly, Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor, became vice-chairman of Kissinger Associates after a military/political career in government.

Today, Kissinger’s differentiation policy still helps perpetuate communism in Eastern Europe without promoting liberation. And Kissinger protégés are still strongly in charge of policy-making — e.g., Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Burt, Mark Palmer (Eagleburger’s top protégé and Ambassador to Hungary), and Tom Simons (formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and top Soviet Affairs advisor at State).

Under President Ronald Reagan, Kissinger quietly served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Under Reagan, Vice President Bush publicly enunciated the Kissinger differentiation policy in a speech delivered in Vienna in the fall of 1983 — a speech crafted by Kissinger lieutenants Eagleburger and Palmer.

The Kissinger Legacy

Under Bush to an even greater extent than under Reagan, a Kissingerian foreign policy reigns supreme in the physical absence of Kissinger himself. Bush as President has reiterated his Administration’s commitment to differentiation, confirming it with the appointment of such key Kissingerites as Eagleburger, Scowcroft, and Palmer.

Twenty years of Kissingerian foreign policy have adversely affected the cause of freedom. Playing a key role in the Council on Foreign Relations and in the elite circles of power in New York and Washington, Kissinger has helped perpetuate the hated communist system. His policy has not extricated East European countries from communist domination or from the Warsaw Pact. Nor has it brought about improved standards of living, human rights, or political democratization. Tragically, those seeking real freedom from communism can expect no help from the Kissingerites in the Bush Administration.